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Featured Articles
Elaine Gagliardi on The Family Limited Partnership in 2018: Powell, Cahill, and Income Tax Basis at
Death
By Elaine Gagliardi, Professor of Law, University of Montana Blewett School of Law*
§ 1.01 Introduction
The Tax Court’s 2017 holding in Estate of Powell v. Commissioner1 followed by its 2018 decision in Estate
of Cahill v. Commissioner,2 signals a need to rethink how best to structure the family limited partnership and the
terms of the partnership agreement. In a shift away from its historical approach to analyzing gross estate inclusion
of family limited partnership assets, the Powell court endorses application of Section 2036(a)(2) 3 to include the
value of partnership assets in decedent’s gross estate, and in an unprecedented step employs Section 2043 to
determine the value of family limited partnership assets includible in the gross estate. Going forward, these
decisions impact how best to plan with family limited partnerships for both those clients who will owe estate tax
and those who will not. This article discusses the estate planning consequences of these decisions with regard to
the family limited partnership and the impact of the Powell decision on the determination of income tax basis of
partnership assets included in the gross estate.
After Estate of Powell, the mere ability of a donor to join in a decision to terminate the partnership,
regardless of whether the donor could have controlled the outcome, causes inclusion of assets in donor’s gross estate
absent showing of a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration. The court’s opinion in Estate of Powell, as
delivered by Judge Halpern, for the first time determines the value included in the gross estate under Section
2036(a)(2) by applying Section 2043, and consequently includes in the gross estate only that portion of partnership
assets equal to the “discount” attributable to the partnership interests received by decedent on formation of the
family limited partnership, with any remaining value accounted for under Section 2033 based on the limited
partnership interests held by decedent at death. This latter of the two holdings in Powell prompted a concurrence
by Judge Lauber, and a divided court on the issue of whether to change the manner in which the court has historically
determined the value included in the gross estate when Section 2036 causes inclusion of limited partnership assets
in decedent’s gross estate. Following Estate of Powell, the question becomes whether Powell signals a seismic shift
or no more than a mere ripple on the estate planning landscape in the Tax Court’s approach to family limited
partnerships.
To eliminate any doubt about the Tax Court’s willingness to rely on Section 2036(a)(2) in the context of
family limited partnerships and other estate planning techniques, the Tax Court a year later issued its 2018 decision
in Estate of Cahill v. Commissioner 4 applying a similar analysis in the context of generational split dollar life
insurance arrangements. Not surprisingly both cases, Estate of Powell and Estate of Cahill, rest on facts that some
would characterize as egregious. The nature of the underlying facts in these cases leave open the question of
whether these holdings will apply in cases where planning is completed well before the anticipated death of the
donor and while donor remains in good health. Both make clear formation of a family limited partnership falling
within the bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration exception escapes inclusion of its assets in the gross
estate.
*Elaine Gagliardi is a Professor at the University of Montana, Blewett School of Law. She is a member of both
the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel and the American College of Tax Counsel. She co–authors
Modern Estate Planning, 2nd Ed (LexisNexis) and currently authors How to Save Time and Taxes Handling
Estates (Mathew Bender).
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The article begins with a discussion of the estate planning implications of Estate of Powell and Estate of
Cahill for family limited partnerships. It next moves to a discussion of the income tax basis implications of the
Powell opinion in light of the Tax Court’s 2017 decision, Hurford Investments No. 2, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 5
addressing income tax basis of family limited partnership assets. Whether going forward the Tax Court embraces
Judge Halpern’s analysis or that of Judge Lauber will impact the answers to the issue of income tax basis. Income
tax basis at death becomes important for many in light of the current increase in the applicable exclusion amount to
$11,180,000 for 2018, and $11,400,000 for 2019.
§ 1.02 Impact of Powell and Cahill on Family Limited Partnership Planning Techniques
[1] Estate of Powell v. Commissioner
The Tax Court in Estate of Powell v. Commissioner,6 a reviewed decision, extends the reach of Section
2036(a)(2) beyond its prior application. In addition, the Powell court breaks new, and unexpected ground, in
applying Section 2043 to determine the amount included in the decedent’s gross estate as a result of Section 2036
inclusion. Judge Halpern wrote for the court, with seven Tax Court judges joining in his opinion and two judges
concurring in result only. Judge Lauber wrote a concurring opinion disagreeing with Judge Halpern’s Section 2043
analysis, and six judges joined in the opinion of Judge Lauber. What becomes clear, given the opinions of both
Judges Halpern and Lauber, is the substantial agreement of the court as to the expanded reach of Section 2036(a)(2).
Significant disagreement remains, however, as to the appropriateness of applying a Section 2043 analysis to
determine the amount ultimately includible in decedent’s gross estate pursuant to Section 2036. Only eight of the
17 judges hearing Powell explicitly support application of Section 2043 to determine value included in the gross
estate.
[a] Facts of Estate of Powell
Decedent Nancy H. Powell through her son, Jeff, who was serving as her attorney-in-fact, formed a family
limited partnership (NHP, LP) by transferring cash and securities from decedent’s revocable trust to NHP, LP in
return for a 99 percent limited partnership interest. The stipulated value of the cash and securities transferred by
decedent in exchange for limited partnership interests equaled $10,000,752. Jeff, as general partner, formed the
Delaware limited partnership two days prior to decedent’s transfer in exchange for the limited partner interests. The
limited partnership terms provided the general partner “sole discretion to determine the amount and timing of
partnership distributions.”7 Judge Halpern’s opinion also highlights the ability to dissolve the partnership with
“written consent of all partners.”8
On the same day as decedent received limited partnership interests, Jeff, also in his capacity as attorney-infact, assigned the limited partnership interests to the Nancy H. Powell Foundation, formed as a charitable lead
annuity trust or CLAT, with decedent’s two sons as remainder beneficiaries. The day prior to the transfers from
decedent to NHP, LP and thereafter from decedent to the CLAT, two physicians at decedent’s care facility
determined she was incapacitated. The power of attorney granted son the power to “[t]o grant, convey, sell, transfer,
mortgage, deed in trust, pledge and otherwise deal in all property real and personal, which the principal may own.”9
It also granted son the power to make gifts “to a class composed of the principal’s children, any of such children’s
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issue, or any or all to the full extent of the federal annual gift tax exclusion …”10 It did not grant the power to make
gifts to a charity.
In delivering the opinion of the court, Judge Halpern does not include in the statement of facts whether Jeff
made a proportionate contribution for his general partnership interest. Judge Halpern also does not clarify in what
capacity Jeff served as general partner, but the opinion implies Jeff held the general partnership interests in his
individual capacity. Judge Lauber’s concurring opinion specifies the sons contributed unsecured promissory notes
in exchange for their respective interests. It is not clear from either opinion what, if any, interest Jeff’s brother held
in the limited partnership.
Decedent reported a 2008 taxable gift of $1,661,442 to the CLAT, representing the value of the remainder
interest of her two sons. An appraisal valued the 99 percent limited partnership interest at $7,516,773, reflective of
a 25 percent discount from the reported value of the cash and securities of $10,022,570.11 The valuations presumed
decedent suffered a terminal illness.
[b] Powell’s Application of Section 2036(a)(2)
Noting the purpose of summary judgment to “expedite” and “avoid unnecessary and expensive trials,” the
Tax Court focuses its analysis on gross estate inclusion under Section 2036(a)(2) given that no factual questions
needed resolution in determining the application of that section.12 The Code pursuant to Section 2036(a)(2) requires
gross estate inclusion of the value of property interests transferred with respect to which decedent retains a “right,
either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or
the income therefrom.” The Tax Court analyzes two factors and acknowledges that either one alone can cause gross
estate inclusion under Section 2036(a)(2). It focuses on the ability of the general partner to control timing and
amount of distributions, and on the partners ability to join together to terminate the partnership and thereby control
timing of the distribution. Judge Halpern’s opinion harkens back to Judge Cohen’s memorandum decision in
Strangi v, Commissioner13 for precedent with respect to each factor.
[i] Ability of Partners to Dissolve Partnership
First, Judge Halpern’s opinion focuses on the right of decedent and her sons under the limited partnership
agreement to dissolve the partnership with the written consent of all partners. It reasons “decedent’s ability to
dissolve NHP with the cooperation of her sons constituted” a prohibited retained right under Section 2036(a)(2). 14
Quoting Strangi, the opinion concludes: “The ability to dissolve the partnership carried with it the ability to direct
the disposition of its assets.” 15 The court determines gross estate inclusion follows under Section 2036(a)(2)
whether the transfer to the CLAT is respected or not. 16 The jointly held power to dissolve the entity allowed
decedent the right with others to designate possession or enjoyment of the property. 17
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The opinion notes that the gross estate would include the transfers even if the transfer to the CLAT is respected.
That conclusion would follow because absent the transfer of the limited partnership interests to the CLAT within
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Judge Halpern’s analysis, however, fails to discuss or distinguish Treasury regulations specifying that
similar rights granted to a settlor to join with all beneficiaries to dissolve a trust would not trigger application of
Section 2038 provided “the power adds nothing to the rights of the parties under local law.” 18 The Treasury
regulation reflects the United States Supreme Court holding in Helvering v. Helmholz,19 which addressed a right
granted all beneficiaries to terminate a trust and concluded such right does not cause inclusion in a beneficiary’s
estate on the grounds that the law should recognize the
essential difference between a power … and a condition which the law imposes. The general rule is that
all parties in interest may terminate the trust [citing the Restatement of the Law of Trusts §§ 337, 338]. The
clause in question added nothing to the rights which the law conferred. Congress cannot tax as a transfer
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at the death of the settlor of a trust created in a state
whose law permits all the beneficiaries to terminate the trust.
Similar reasoning should apply to powers to affect beneficial enjoyment of transferred property. At the time
the Supreme Court decided Helmholz, there was no predecessor statute to Section 2036(a)(2) and, as a result, the
Court did not address that provision directly. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA), similar to that of trust
law addressed in Helmholz, recognizes the right of all general partners, in conjunction with limited partners holding
a majority right to distribution, to join together to dissolve the limited partnership. 20 Under the Tax Court’s analysis
in Powell v. Commissioner, limited partnerships formed in one of the 22 states adopting the ULPA, thus, may be
susceptible to gross estate inclusion if the ULPA default rules are not changed by agreement and decedent holds a
general partnership interest or sufficient limited partnership interests. Importantly, the court in Powell bases its
decision on powers specified in the partnership agreement, as opposed to those implied by state law. It may be the
court would not have arrived at the same conclusion had the partnership agreement not specifically granted the joint
power to dissolve.
The question becomes whether courts will broadly apply Estate of Powell’s Section 2036(a)(2) holding or
limit the holding to facts similar to those of Strangi and Powell where decedent’s attorney-in-fact made transfers at
a point where decedent was rapidly failing. Both Judge Halpern’s opinion and Judge Lauber’s opinion agree Section
2036(a)(2) applies to include property interests transferred to the partnership in Mrs. Powell’s gross estate. Recall
that from Strangi in 2003 to Powell in 2017, few other courts have applied Section 2036(a)(2) to include underlying
partnership assets in the decedent’s gross estate. The court in Estate of Turner v. Commissioner,21 applied Section
2036(a)(2) where decedent retained a power to amend the partnership agreement as general partner. Perhaps, in an
effort to signal the Tax Court’s intention to apply Section 2036(a)(2) consistently going forward, the Tax Court,
shortly after its issuance of Estate of Powell, reiterated Powell’s application of Section 2036(a)(2) in Estate of Cahill
v. Commissioner,22 an opinion authored by Judge Thornton, who joined in Judge Halpern’s opinion in Estate of
Powell. Citing Estate of Powell, Estate of Cahill holds Section 2036(a)(2) applies to a jointly held power to
terminate a generational split dollar life insurance arrangement.
[ii] Illusory Fiduciary Duties When Decedent’s Attorney-in-Fact Serves as
General Partner
Second, the Tax Court in Estate of Powell focuses on whether decedent retained a prohibited right to
designate possession and enjoyment of the property transferred to the limited partnership by Jeff, in his capacity as
decedent’s attorney-in-fact. Jeff also acted as general partner in his individual capacity. Although in Estate of
Powell the decedent never owned any interest in the general partner (instead holding only limited partnership
interests), the Tax Court analogizes to Estate of Strangi where in that case decedent held an interest in the corporate
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general partner, and, in turn, the corporate general partner appointed decedent’s attorney-in-fact to serve as general
partner. The Tax Court in Estate of Powell explains:
[W]e concluded in Estate of Strangi that the decedent held the right, through his son-in-law, to determine
the amount and timing of partnership distributions. The partnership agreement granted that authority to the
managing general partner, a corporation owned by the decedent and other family members. The corporate
general partner delegated its authority to the decedent’s son-in-law in a management agreement. The sonin-law also served as the decedent’s attorney-in-fact under a power of attorney. Thus, we concluded,
"Decedent’s attorney-in-fact thereby stood in a position to make distribution decisions.” … In the present
cases, NHP’s limited partnership agreement gives Mr. Powell, as general partner, sole discretion to
determine the amount and timing of partnership distributions. And, as in Estate of Strangi, the person with
authority to determine distributions also served as decedent’s attorney-in-fact.23
The Tax Court employed the same reasoning in distinguishing Estate of Powell and Estate of Strangi from
the Supreme Court’s holding in Byrum v. United States.24 The Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion
when addressing the interest of a controlling stockholder in a corporation. The Supreme Court in Byrum rejected
the argument that decedent retained a prohibited right under Section 2036(a)(2) on the basis that, as controlling
shareholder, he could vote shares to control the board of directors and “thereby determine the flow of income to the
trust.”25 The Court noted that only the trustee of the trust owning the shares could make that determination and not
the decedent, Byrum. The Court further reasoned, as controlling shareholder, Byrum owed fiduciary duties to other
minority shareholders, some of whom were not family members. The Tax Court in both Estate of Strangi and
Estate of Powell distinguishes Byrum on the basis the fiduciary duties owed were illusory because decedent, through
decedent’s attorney-in-fact, owed fiduciary duties to himself or herself. The Powell court essentially imputes the
rights and duties of the general partner or manager to the decedent on the basis that the general partner is decedent’s
attorney-in-fact.
The Powell court does not discuss the factual differences between Strangi and Powell, specifically, that in
Powell decedent never owned an interest in the general partner. As a result it would have been difficult to argue
that she “retained” what the Byrum court termed a “legally enforceable” right to make decisions relegated only to
the general partner. In Byrum the Supreme Court concluded Byrum did not have an “unconstrained de facto power
to regulate the flow of dividends to the trust, much less the right to designate who was to enjoy the income from
trust property.”26 While Mrs. Powell was owed a fiduciary duty by her son as attorney-in-fact and as general partner,
she also did not have an unconstrained right herself to control enjoyment of the limited partnership. Her son owned
the general partner interest. An attorney-in-fact owes duties to the principal only with respect to property subject
to the power of attorney, although admittedly the attorney-in-fact should not undertake a conflicting interest
transaction. The fact the Powell court does not address this difference between the two cases, Strangi and Powell,
implies that, if a person owns an interest in the general partner and at the same time serves as the attorney-in-fact
for the decedent, the decedent will be deemed to retain prohibited rights to designate enjoyment of income and
property under Section 2036(a)(2) if the decedent, as a result, is deemed to stand on both sides of the transaction.
If the goal is to avoid gross estate inclusion, going forward the decedent’s attorney-in-fact should refrain from
serving as general partner of the family limited partnership.
[iii] Lessons from Powell on Structuring an FLP
The Powell holding makes it exceedingly difficult to avoid Section 2036 if formation of the limited
partnership does not meet the bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration exception of Section 2036. The
estate in Powell did not argue it met the bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration exception. 27 Estate of
23
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Powell, as reinforced by the Tax Court’s opinions in Estate of Cahill and Estate of Turner, teaches the donordecedent should not retain any management rights, veto powers or other jointly held rights to direct assets of the
limited partnership. Neither should any person who owes a fiduciary duty to the donor-decedent hold such powers.
Powell essentially limits those who can serve as general partner to someone other than decedent or decedent’s
attorney-in-fact if donor-decedent aims to avoid gross estate inclusion. An independent manager subject to
fiduciary duties provides the best chance of avoiding the reach of Section 2036(a)(2). Planners have kept this lesson
in mind since issuance of the Tax Court’s decision in Estate of Strangi.
For taxpayers who no longer have concerns about owing federal estate tax because their assets do not exceed
the combined applicable exclusion amounts of both spouses, the lessons of Powell may be of no concern. For these
individuals, the increase in applicable exclusion amount leaves open the possibility of using the family limited
partnership as a vehicle to provide management of assets during life and some continued control of assets following
client’s death. It also may be possible to design the provisions of the FLP to obtain a step-up in basis at death and
achieve the primary tax goal of clients whose assets fall within the applicable exclusion amount.
[c] Powell’s Application of Section 2043(a)
Judge Halpern’s opinion for the court in Estate of Powell and Judge Lauber’s concurring opinion part ways
on the appropriateness of applying Section 2043 to determine the value included in the gross estate of decedent
under Section 2036. Writing for the court, Judge Halpern acknowledges the Tax Court has not previously applied
Section 2043 to family limited partnerships includible in the gross estate under Section 2036. The opinion sets out
to resolve what it unilaterally terms “the illogic” of current law noting:
[T]he Commissioner customarily includes in the value of her gross estate the value of the assets transferred
inter vivos to the partnership in lieu of the value of the partnership interest that the decedent actually owned
at death (which would otherwise be includible in the value of her gross estate under section 2033). The
illogic of including in the value of a decedent’s gross estate both the assets transferred to a family limited
partnership and the partnership interest received in return seems to have been widely recognized, but the
precise legal grounds that prevent such illogical “double taxation” have gone unarticulated. 28
Judge Halpern resolves the illogic by including limited partnership interests in the gross estate under Section
2033, and only the value of the discount under Section 2036(a). Judge Lauber’s concurring opinion disagrees with
this approach: “By adopting an untried new theory without first hearing from the parties, we risk creating problems
that we do not yet know about. The more prudent (and conservative) approach in my view would be to adhere to
the letter and spirit of our precedent, leaving the law in the relatively stable position it appears to occupy now.” 29
Judge Lauber’s concurring opinion indicates, for example, the acknowledged possibility that application of Section
2043 can yield a “duplicative reduction” or “increase” in transfer tax. 30
[i] Application of Section 2043(a) in Powell
Judge Halpern’s opinion forges a new path by applying Section 2043(a) to determine the appropriate
amount included in the gross estate under Section 2036. Application of Section 2043(a) includes in the gross estate
“only the excess of fair market value at the time of death of the property otherwise to be included [in this case under
Section 2036] on account of such transaction” less “the value of consideration received therefor by the decedent.” 31
The Code section applies if the transfer “is made … for a consideration in money or money’s worth, but is not a
bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.” 32 In Estate of Powell, Judge
Halpern explains: “In the present cases, because of the limitation provided by section 2043(a), section 2036(a)(2),
28

Id. at 409–410.
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if applicable, would include in the value of decedent’s gross estate only the excess of the fair market value at the
time of her death of the cash and securities transferred to NHP over the value of the 99% limited partner interest in
NHP issued in exchange for those assets.” 33 In other words, the gross estate per Section 2036(a)(2) includes only
the discount allowable based on date of death value, referred to by the court as “the doughnut hole,” with the
partnership interests referred to as the “doughnut” includible under Section 2033 or if transferred during life
accounted for at death as an adjusted taxable gift. 34 Accordingly, Judge Halpern determines the purpose underlying
Section 2043(a) is to limit “the reach of the inclusionary rules to transactions that deplete a decedent’s estate” is
fulfilled.35 It notes: “To the extent that the value of assets transferred to a family limited partnership does not
exceed the value of the partnership interest received in return, the exchange does not deplete the transferor’s estate
or allow for the avoidance of transfer taxes.”36
[ii] Reasoning of Concurring Opinion
The concurring opinion of Judge Lauber begins by noting Judge Halpern’s acknowledgment that Section
2036 “does not require ‘the inclusion in the value of decedent's gross estate of the full date-of-death value of the
cash and securities,’ while admitting that the statute, ‘read in isolation, would require that result.’ ”37 Judge Lauber
explains that in fact current law does not result in the double inclusion issue claimed by the Tax Court’s opinion.
The concurring opinion reasons: “The partnership was an empty box into which the $10 million was notionally
placed. Once that $10 million is included in [decedent’s] gross estate under section 2036(a)(2), it seems perfectly
reasonable to regard the partnership interest as having no distinct value because it was an alter ego for the $10
million of cash and securities.”38 The court notes: “This is the approach that we have previously taken to this
problem.”39
[iii] Troublesome Aspects of Applying Section 2043(a)
The Tax Court, prior to Judge Halpern’s opinion in Estate of Powell, has consistently rejected the notion
that I.RC. Section 2043 should apply to inclusion of limited partnership assets under Section 2036. The court
acknowledges as much when it notes its prior opinion in Estate of Harper v. Commissioner 40 declined to apply
Section 2043. The court in Estate of Harper stated:
We therefore hold that where a transaction involves only the genre of value “recycling” described above
and does not appear to be motivated primarily by legitimate business concerns, no transfer for consideration
within the meaning of section 2036(a) has taken place. Hence, the exception provided in that statute is
inapplicable. Furthermore, although section 2043 can entitle taxpayers to an offset for partial consideration
in cases where a transfer is otherwise subject to section 2036, this section, too, is inapplicable where, as
here, there has been only a recycling of value and not a transfer for consideration.41
The Harper court did not see fit to apply Section 2043 where the transaction was not “bona fide.” Only
once, in a later case, Estate of Abraham v. Commissioner,42 did the court acknowledge without disagreement a
reduction allowed by the Service to the value included in the gross estate based on cash consideration received by

33

Estate of Powell at 407.
Id. at 408–409.
35
Id. at 406.
36
Id. at 408–409.
37
Id. at 422.
38
Id. at 423.
39
Id.
40
TC Memo 2002–121
41
Id.
42
TC Memo 2004–39, aff’d 408 F.3d 26 (1st Cir 2005).
34

decedent from a beneficiary. In that case the consideration came from the beneficiary, not as a result of a recognition
of a contribution to the partnership by decedent herself.
Courts have applied Section 2043 in other contexts where the beneficiary transferred consideration to the
donor, but not where what is received is part of the formalities of a transaction that is not deemed bona fide. The
Second Circuit, in addressing a sale of a personal residence for a note and mortgage where decedent’s rental
payments to live in the residence equaled the mortgage payments, held Section 2043 inapplicable on the basis the
transaction was not bona fide finding the transfer was without any consideration. 43 In contrast to the Second
Circuit’s decision, which did not count the mortgage as consideration received, Judge Halpern’s opinion in Estate
of Powell counts the limited partnership interests as consideration despite the fact no consideration was paid by a
third party and the partnership interests do no more than represent the proportion of the assets contributed to the
partnership. In this respect Judge Halpern’s analysis departs from prior law on Section 2043.
Yet another analogy would be to formation of a trust. For example, where a grantor retains an income
interest in a trust to which grantor has made a transfer, the income interest retained is not deemed to be adequate
consideration for the transfer when determining gross estate inclusion under Section 2036. Similarly, it does not
make sense to treat receipt of partnership interests as consideration when applying Section 2043 in the context of
Section 2036 inclusion as they are nothing more than the retained interest of the donor on formation. Judge Lauber’s
concurring opinion notes this concern when it cites cases indicating a retained interest does not constitute
consideration under Section 2043.44 Consideration to meet the Section 2036 exception in the trust context must
come from a third party to the decedent. 45 It would seem the same should be true in the limited partnership context
where the property is simply received in return for decedent’s formation contribution. This is yet another example
of the incongruence with which Section 2036 has been applied by the courts to family limited partnerships. 46
In delivering the court’s decision in Estate of Powell, Judge Halpern spends considerable time discussing
the meaning of Section 2043’s reference: “but is not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money’s worth. …”47 As explained, other courts interpret this phrase to focus on whether the consideration was
“full and adequate.” Judge Halpern’s opinion instead focuses on both prongs — whether the sale is bona fide, and
whether it is for adequate and full consideration. It essentially modifies the prior understanding of the “adequate
and full consideration” prong. In a footnote, the opinion indicates the former “proportionality” test for adequate
consideration as applied in Bongard v. Commissioner48 now applies only to those cases where there is a legitimate
and significant nontax reason for the partnership. 49 Judge Halpern’s opinion concludes that, when the “bona fide
sale exception” does not apply, “if the decedent receives some consideration, section 2043(a) limits the required
inclusion to the amount by which the transfer depletes the decedent’s estate.” 50 Earlier courts held the “adequate
and full consideration” prong satisfied if the donor received in return a proportional interest in the entity. Under
Estate of Powell, essentially any time the “bona fide” prong remains unsatisfied, proportional receipt of interests
fails the “adequate and full consideration” prong when a discount is included in valuation of limited partner interests.
This analysis is difficult to understand. It makes sense that proportionality does not run afoul of “the full and
Estate of Maxwell v Commissioner, 3 F3d 591 (2nd Cir 1993) aff’g 98 TC 594 (1992).
Estate of Powell at 423 (the court cites: “Estate of Gregory v Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1012, 1020 (1963) (holding
that a decedent’s retained interest in her own property cannot constitute consideration under section 2043(a)).”
45
See Treas Reg § 20.2043–1(b) (discussing types of consideration from spouse that would be considered per
Section 2043); Wheeler v United States, 116 F3d 749 (5th Cir 1997) (consideration from children paid to donor for
remainder interest deemed full and adequate consideration).
46
For further discussion of the difficulty in applying Section 2036 to family limited partnerships, see Mitchell M.
Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Family Limited Partnerships and Section 2036: Not Such a Good Fit, 42 ACTEC
L.J. 253, 269 (2017).
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adequate consideration” because the person contributing to the partnership changes only the form of what is owned,
but when the contributor gets more or less than the contributor’s proportionate share a partner is getting either more
or less and should be deemed then to be receiving or giving consideration from or to another. Consistency would
urge respecting the reality that partnership interests represent proportional value of property contributed regardless
of whether the bona fide sale exception is met. The limited partnership interests represent the property contributed.
Judge Halpern’s opinion is troublesome in this respect.
[iv] Questions Remaining After Powell
The concurring opinion leaves a ring of truth when it warns: “By adopting an untried new theory without
first hearing from the parties, we risk creating problems that we do not yet know about.”51 Among the questions
left unanswered by the differing opinions in Powell are: If decedent successfully transfers partnership interests
prior to death, will the limited partnership interests escape taxation with only those assets equal to the discount
allowed on formation included in decedent’s gross estate? How will the opinions in Powell impact application of
Section 1014? Should the “discount” Judge Halpern’s opinion includes in the gross estate under Section 2036(a)(2)
be added to the basis of the partnership assets included in the gross estate?
Judge Halpern’s opinion leaves a larger unanswered question regarding application of Section 2043 to
limited partnerships. Is that opinion precedential as regards to its analysis and application of Section 2043(a) to
limited partnership assets includible under Section 2036? Including Judge Halpern, only eight of seventeen judges
explicitly agree with the portion of the opinion of the court addressing application of Section 2043 to determine
inclusion of family limited partnership assets under Section 2036. Including Judge Lauber, seven judges agree with
the concurring opinion rejecting application of Section 2043 on the facts of Powell, which is referenced as an
opinion “concurring in the result only.” Two other judges “concur in the result only,” but do not join in either
opinion and there is no explanation as to why the two judges chose not to join in agreement with Judge Halpern’s
opinion or the concurring opinion. Thus, while all judges either join or concur in the court’s opinion, only eight
judges have signified agreement with application of Section 2043 to determine value included in the gross estate.
There is no clear majority supporting application of Section 2043 in determining the value to be included per Section
2036(a)(2). Nonetheless, the court’s holding is clear that decedent’s gross estate in Powell includes an amount
equal to the full value of the partnership assets: Sections 2033 and 2036, in conjunction with 2043(a), per Judge
Halpern would include in the gross estate value equal to that of the partnership assets, while Section 2036(a)(2)
would include the value of the partnership assets per Judge Lauber. Perhaps this lack of any difference in actual
monetary result given the unique facts of Estate of Powell is the reason two of the judges entered their concurrence
in result only. We will likely not know unless Judges Foley and Paris take the opportunity to address this issue in
a later opinion.
[v] What Results Based on the Differing Analyses
The analytical approaches of Judge Halpern and Judge Lauber differ significantly. The core difference
rests in the treatment of whether both the partnership and partnership interests should be deemed illusory for
purposes of determining inclusion in the gross estate.
Judge Halpern finds it “illogical” to ignore the existence of the partnership interests that should be included
under Section 2033. In doing so, Judge Halpern’s analysis inconsistently recognizes the existence and includability
of the partnership interests despite acknowledging appropriateness of the “recycling” of value theory that has caused
the court to ignore existence of the partnership, itself, in favor of including the partnership assets. In discussing the
recycling theory which treats the partnership as illusory when there is an absence of pooling of assets, Judge Halpern
reasons:
Therefore, the degree of pooling is relevant to the question of the nontax bona fides of the transaction. But
we see no reason why the degree of pooling should affect the extent to which a partnership interest received
51
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in exchange for transferred assets should be treated as consideration received for those assets in applying
section 2036(a) or section 2043(a).52
The opinion ignores the partnership for purposes of applying I.R.C. Section 2036 and yet conflictingly
recognizes existence of partnership interests held by decedent in an “illusory” partnership for purposes of applying
Sections 2043 and 2033.
By contrast, Judge Lauber’s opinion ignores both the existence of the partnership and the partnership
interests in light of underpinnings of the recycling theory. Judge Lauber, consistent with Tax Court precedent,
would include the full value of the partnership assets in decedent’s gross estate and ignore existence of both the
partnership and partnership interests for purposes of the estate tax analysis. Judge Lauber’s opinion would not
recognize the partnership interest as having value recognizable for purposes of either 2043 or 2033.
Applying either opinion, the gross estate includes the same ultimate value. Use of a simplified hypothetical
is helpful in understanding the differing analyses of Judges Halpern and Lauber. The hypothetical highlights the
manner in which the opinions differ in their treatment of the partnership and the partnership interests as illusory, or
not. It demonstrates that, despite these differences, decedent’s gross estate includes the same total value. Later, the
hypothetical will be used to demonstrate that the differing analyses result in significantly different treatment with
regard to income tax basis on a decedent’s death.
Hypothetical: For illustration purposes, assume decedent forms a limited partnership with one share of
stock valued at $100, and assume limited partnership interests received in return take a fair market value of
$75 after application of a 25% discount. Assume further that decedent’s basis in the share of stock at the
time of its contribution to the partnership is $40. Further assume decedent owns the limited partnership
interests at death and did not make any transfers of interests prior to death. Under either Judge Halpern’s
analysis or Judge Lauber’s analysis, the gross estate includes $100 of total value. Per Judge Halpern the
estate would include 25% of the share value representing the discount and $75 representing the value of the
limited partnership interests owned by decedent, for a total of $100. Judge Lauber would include the value
of the share of stock at $100.
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[2] Estate of Cahill v. Commissioner
The next published Tax Court opinion to address inclusion under Section 2036(a)(2) reinforces the holding
of Estate of Powell and applies a similar rational to inclusion of decedent’s rights in three generational split dollar
arrangements. Judge Thornton, who joined in the opinion of the court in Estate of Powell, delivered the
memorandum opinion in Estate of Cahill v. Commissioner.53
[a] Facts of Estate of Cahill
Decedent’s son, Patrick Cahill, entered into split dollar agreements on behalf of his father, Richard Cahill,
at a time when Richard was 90 years old and lacked capacity to manage his own affairs. Richard died on December
12, 2011. Patrick served as Richard’s attorney-in-fact and as trustee of Richard’s “Survivor” trust. The parties
stipulate that Richard’s gross estate includes the assets of the Survivor Trust. 54 In 2010, as attorney-in-fact, Patrick
created the irrevocable “Morris Brown Trust,” termed the MB Trust, naming his cousin and business partner
William as trustee, and himself and his descendants as beneficiaries. The MB Trust owns three whole life insurance
policies, two on the life of Patrick’s spouse with a policy amount of $39.8 million, and one on Patrick’s life with a
policy amount of $40 million, with each policy guaranteeing a 3-percent return. Each policy is the subject of a split
dollar agreement with the Survivor Trust agreeing to pay the premium as an advance to the MB Trust. 55 The
Survivor Trust obtained a five-year loan at 1.5 percent interest, guaranteed by Richard and Patrick, for the purpose
of making the premium payment. The split dollar agreements further provided: “Survivor Trust will receive a
portion of the death benefit equal to the greatest of: any remaining balance on the loan as relates to the relevant
policy, the total premiums paid by Survivor Trust with respect to that policy, or the cash surrender value of the
policy immediately before the insured's death.”56 The MB Trust receives the excess. Under the agreements “MB
Trust is not permitted to sell, assign, transfer, borrow against, surrender, or cancel the related policy without the
consent of Survivor Trust.”57
In exchange for $10 million in premium payments, Richard retained termination rights. Richard, in
conjunction with MB Trust, could terminate the split dollar agreements and either (1) MB Trust then could retain
the policy and pay Richard the greater of premium payment or cash surrender value of the policy; or, (2) MB Trust
could decline to retain the policy and pay over the policy to the bank in satisfaction of the five-year loan.58 Because
it would not make economic sense for MB Trust to allow exercise of the termination rights, the estate took the
position the termination rights had no value. The estate also took the position that Richard’s right to the death
benefits was worth little because the insureds were expected to outlive Richard. On Richard’s death the combined
cash surrender value of the policies totaled $9,611,624.59 The estate tax return for Richard’s estate reported the
total value as $183,700, and Richard had previously reported a gift under the economic benefit regime of $7,578.60
Although Cahill specifically addresses split dollar arrangements and not family limited partnership interests
as addressed in Powell, it does signal the Tax Court’s willingness to apply the Section 2036(a)(2) analysis of Estate
of Powell in a situation where decedent’s attorney-in-fact orchestrated the estate planning transfers. In addition, it
reaffirms in dicta the Tax Court’s earlier position on the application of Section 2703 to partnership formation and
the partnership agreement itself. It hints, however, at broader application of that provision. It also addresses the
economic benefit regime as applicable specifically to split dollar arrangements, and that discussion is not reviewed
as part of this article.
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[b] Cahill’s Application of Section 2036(a)(2)
With reference to Estate of Powell, the Tax Court determines Sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038(a)(1) apply to
include in decedent’s gross estate his interest in the cash surrender value of the insurance policies under the split
dollar arrangements. The Cahill court rejected the estate’s assertion that because the irrevocable MB trust could
prevent termination of the split dollar arrangement, the decedent had not retained any rights to the cash surrender
value of the policy. In response, the court cited the ability of decedent, through the revocable trust, to terminate the
split dollar arrangement in conjunction with the irrevocable trustee, asserting “the words ‘in conjunction with any
person’ in section 2036(a)(2), and ‘in conjunction with any other person’ in section 2038(a)(1)” must be given
meaning.”61 Analyzing the facts it concluded: “the rights to terminate and recover at least the cash surrender value
were clearly rights, held in conjunction with another person (MB Trust), both to designate the persons who would
possess or enjoy the transferred property under section 2036(a)(2) and to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the
transfer under section 2038(a)(1).” 62 It did not matter that the decedent could not unilaterally force termination.
In applying the bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration exception, the court addressed both prongs
– whether the transaction was bona fide, and whether there was adequate and full consideration received by Richard.
In determining whether the transaction was bona fide, the court queried: “Whether a transfer was a bona fide sale
is a question of business purpose; i.e., did decedent have a legitimate and significant nontax reason, established by
the record, for transferring the $10 million?” 63 Unresolved facts precluded the court from determining the bona
fide nature of the transaction. The manner in which the court stated the question may indicate a shift in focus to
whether the transaction makes economic sense from the perspective of the transferor. As to the second prong of
the exception, the court determined the transaction lacked adequate and full consideration. The court applied the
following test: “Whether a transfer was for adequate and full consideration is a question of value; i.e., did what
decedent transferred roughly equal the value of what he received in return?” 64 Focusing on the estate’s application
of a 98 percent discount, and noting that the basis for the discount applied from the inception of the transaction, the
court determined there was a failure to meet the adequate and full consideration prong of the exception. On this
basis the court denied the estate’s request for summary judgement that Section 2036(a)(2) and 2038(a)(1) do not
apply. Should a discount indicate a lack of adequate and full consideration?
Notably the court did not address Section 2043 although it could have chosen to do so in a manner analogous
to the court’s application of that provision in Estate of Powell. The court could have viewed the value of the rights
in the split dollar arrangements provided the decedent consideration for the premium payments on the life insurance
policies similarly to the court’s analysis in Estate of Powell where it viewed receipt of partnership interests as
consideration for assets transferred pursuant to the partnership agreement. The fact the Cahill court chose not to
address Section 2043 in contrast to Judge Halpern’s analysis in Estate of Powell, where there was similarly a lack
of briefing on the application of Section 2043, may signal the court’s reluctance to apply that section in contexts
outside of the limited partnership scenario.
[c] Cahill’s Application of Section 2703
In dicta, the Cahill court addressed application of Section 2703 to family limited partnerships and, in doing
so, distinguished treatment of family limited partnership interests under Section 2703 from that of split dollar
arrangements. The court rejected the estate’s argument that split dollar arrangements are like partnerships. It
reaffirmed its prior holdings addressing how Section 2703 applies to family limited partnerships:
In Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, [citation omitted], we held that “Congress did not intend, by the
enactment of section 2703, to treat partnership assets as if they were assets of the estate where the legal
interest owned by the decedent at the time of death was a limited partnership or corporate interest.” In other
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words, section 2703 generally does not function as a look-through rule for entities which are valid under
State law. No State law entity is involved in this case. Estate of Strangi is therefore inapplicable. Moreover,
whereas in Estate of Strangi the Commissioner “did not argue separately that the … shareholders' agreement
should be disregarded … under section 2703(a)”, [citation omitted], in this case respondent is specifically
arguing that MB Trust’s ability to prevent termination functions, with respect to decedent's termination
rights, in much the same way a restrictive agreement functions with respect to corporate or partnership
interests.65
The Cahill court draws the distinction between application of Section 2703 to formation of a partnership
and application to the restrictions included in a partnership agreement. It notes that restrictions in a partnership
agreement are subject to analysis under Section 2703 and gives as an example its holding in Holman v.
Commissioner.66 In Holman, the family limited partnership consisted entirely of publicly traded stock interests and
on that basis, where there was no closely held business necessitating the restrictions on sale, Section 2703 would
apply. Viewed critically, this affirmance of the court’s application of Section 2703 may provide little comfort
given the court’s application of that provision to the contract rights under the split dollar arrangement unless the
court’s reference is properly interpreted to apply only to those restrictions in the partnership agreement that vary
state law default rules as to what comprises a partnership.
Notably, the Cahill court begins its Section 2703 analysis with the view that “the relevant property interests
for purposes of section 2703(a) are the rights held under the split dollar agreements, and [] the estate has not disputed
that decedent did, in fact, own the termination rights and decedent’s death benefit rights.”67 The court holds the
split dollar arrangement is subject to the requirements of Section 2703:
On the basis of the undisputed facts, we conclude that under section 2703(a)(1) the split dollar agreements,
and specifically the provisions that prevent decedent from immediately withdrawing his investment, are
agreements to acquire or use property at a price less than fair market value.
***
Next, it is clear that under section 2703(a)(2) the split dollar agreements, and specifically MB Trust’s ability
to prevent termination, also significantly restrict the decedent’s right to use the termination rights.68
With regard to application of Section 2703(a)(1) the court notes the MB Trust provided no consideration
for its rights under the agreement. And, as to Section 2703(a)(2), the court assumes, absent the agreement, decedent
would have the right to terminate the agreements and withdraw from the investment. Might this imply that if both
parties provided consideration Section 2703 would not apply? Of note, the court also distinguishes a promissory
note on the basis that parties bargain and consideration passes both ways under the note. 69
Of great concern, the court brushes aside policy implications of a literal reading of its holding: “if section
2703(a) applies in this case, it would also apply to all sorts of other options, agreements, rights, and restrictions. For
example, the estate argues that ‘almost every two-party agreement has a restriction that one party cannot just
unilaterally terminate the agreement.’ ” 70 The court impliedly acknowledges this broader reading by replying
Congress provided an exception under Section 2703(b), specifically subsection (b)(3), which compares the terms
of the agreement to “similar arrangements entered into by persons in an arms’ length transaction.”71
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Circling back to family limited partnerships, might a court applying Estate of Cahill view the partnership
agreement as incorporating state law and thereby conclude terms restricting unilateral dissolution should be ignored
under Section 2703? Or, would it acknowledge the choice to form a family limited partnership carries with it the
choice to apply default rules of the statute and that only variations from the statutory terms should be scrutinized
under Section 2703? This latter reading appears to be implicit in the prior holdings of the Tax Court as initially
recited rejecting application of Section 2703 to the family limited partnership itself.
For those taxpayers intending to use the family limited partnership to obtain a tax benefit, the planner should
refrain from modifying restrictions applicable pursuant to state law if those restrictions will preclude the agreement
from meeting the requirements of the exception to application of Section 2703. 72 For those taxpayers who are
unconcerned with possible estate or gift tax implications of such restrictions, the application of Section 2703 will
cause partnership interests to be valued as if any restrictions on transfer of use of partnership interests do not apply.
The higher valuation required by Section 2703 may prove important to obtaining a higher income tax basis on
decedent’s death.
§ 1.03 Minimizing Estate Taxes in the Wake of Powell and Cahill
Some may conclude the Tax Court’s holding in Estate of Powell, as reinforced in Estate of Cahill, requires
review and rethinking how to structure and use family limited liability entities to minimize federal estate and gift
taxes. The breadth of Powell’s impact, however, depends on how one views the facts and their impact on the court’s
holding. In Powell, the decedent was unable to manage her affairs, her attorney-in-fact engaged in the formation
of the partnership, the attorney-in-fact choreographed the transaction and stood to benefit, as did the decedent
according to the court, and decedent died shortly after the transaction. Facts similar to these in a number of cases
have led the court to determine the transaction was not “bona fide.”73
The Powell court confirmed a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration avoids application of
Section 2036, and for that matter avoids Sections 2038 as well. Although the court did not directly address whether
the transaction in Estate of Powell was bona fide, relying instead on the estate’s concession, the facts nevertheless
likely impacted the court’s view of the transaction. A family limited partnership complying with the bona fide sale
for adequate and full consideration exception will continue to yield valuation discounts and achieve the goal to
minimize estate tax.
[1] Reliance on Bona Fide Sale for Adequate and Full Consideration Exception
The question becomes: Did the Powell court modify the test for whether the formation of the partnership
and subsequent transfer of partnership interests meets the bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration
exception? The term has come to require a showing of (1) a “legitimate and significant nontax reason” for the
transaction and facts directly supporting the nontax reason, and (2) receipt of partnership interests in proportion to
the partner’s contribution. 74
[a] Meaning of Bona Fide Sale
In discussing the meaning of “bona fide” in relation to Section 2043, as opposed to Section 2036, the
Powell court focuses on whether a “genuine pooling” of assets occurs on formation. In doing so it cites cases prior
to the announcement of the “legitimate and significant nontax reason” requirement formulated by the Tax Court in
Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner.75 The court focuses in Powell on the importance of an arm’s length transaction
and a genuine pooling of assets. This analysis raises questions regarding what must be shown to prove the bona
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fide sale for full and adequate consideration exception applies. The Tax Court in Estate of Cahill provides assurance
that in fact the Bongard court’s “legitimate and significant nontax reason test” remains the correct analysis for
determining whether the I.RC. Section 2036 exception applies, citing a later case, Estate of Hurford v.
Commissioner.76
Over the course of many cases, the meaning of “legitimate and significant nontax reason” has become
clearer. The court looks for a significant motive other than for the purposes of minimizing estate tax. Most
importantly the facts specific to the family circumstances must support the stated nontax reason. Among nontax
reasons supported by the specific facts and found to be legitimate and significant include pursuit of a unique
investment strategy,77 change in management, 78 and fear a closely-held business would fall to owners other than
family members. 79
[b] Meaning of Adequate and Full Consideration
The meaning of adequate and full consideration has come to be understood in the context of a family limited
partnership as requiring an increase in the capital account proportionate to the assets contributed. The Eleventh
Circuit in affirming the Tax Court in Shepherd v. Commissioner80 applied this analysis in determining whether a
gift was made to other partners on contribution of assets to the partnership. The Powell court acknowledges that in
Bongard v. Commissioner81 the court determined the “adequate and full consideration” prong of the exception to
Section 2036 met by satisfaction of the “proportionality” test. 82 Interestingly, the latest versions of the Uniform
Partnership Act, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, and the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act do not so
much as mention capital accounts. The default rule under these acts is to specify distributions; for example, in the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act distributions are proportionate to the value of contributions. 83 In explanation, the
comments to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act suggest information necessary for tax capital accounts can be
obtained from the Act’s distribution requirements. 84 So long as a significant and legitimate nontax reason for
forming the partnership exists, the Powell court acknowledges the proportionality test will meet the bona fide sale
for adequate and full consideration exception. In light of this affirmance of the proportionality test, assuming a
bona fide sale, it may be important to take the cautionary step of providing for capital accounts in those states
adopting the most current version of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
[2] Avoid Decedent or Decedent’s Fiduciary Acting as General Partner
Only if no legitimate and significant nontax reason for formation exists need the planner worry about the
reach of Section 2036. The question now becomes whether the reach of Section 2036 can be avoided if for some
reason the court determines the family limited partnership does not meet the bona fide sale for adequate
consideration exception. For a number of years, since the Tax Court’s 2003 decision in Estate of Strangi v.
Commissioner, 85 planners have been careful not to place the decedent-donor in the position of being able to
participate in management decisions through an ownership interest in the general partner. Read literally, Estate of
Powell simply expands that requirement to necessitate that neither the decedent nor decedent’s attorney-in-fact hold
any interest in the general partner. Read more broadly, it suggests that any person owing fiduciary duties to
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decedent-donor should not hold an interest in the general partner. Fiduciary duties owed by a general partner to
limited partners will not protect the donor who acts as general partner from Section 2036 inclusion.
The question becomes whether, if decedent’s estate can show the family limited partnership meets the bona
fide sale rule, does it even matter whether the decedent or the decedent’s attorney-in-fact held say as a general
partner. The technical answer would be “no.” But in determining whether the “bona fide sale” prong of the
exception is satisfied facts indicating continued control of the assets by the decedent or decedent’s attorney-in-fact
may sway the court to find lack of a bona fide sale. Practically speaking, the better planning decision would be to
avoid giving the decedent or, per Powell, decedent’s attorney-in-fact a general partner interest. The ability for a
family to maintain some control over the general partner and at the same time minimize gift and estate tax liability,
thus, becomes harder to accomplish following Estate of Powell.
[3] Avoid Granting Decedent a Voice as to When the Partnership Dissolves
Absent a determination the partnership complies with the bona fide sale for adequate consideration
exception, Section 2036(a)(2) kicks in to include in the gross estate the value of the partnership assets if the decedent
“in conjunction with any person” can (per the holding in Powell) terminate the partnership. The partnership
agreement in Powell specifically included a provision allowing the partners to unanimously dissolve the partnership.
The court relied on this provision, and not a provision implied by the default rules of state law. In the wake of
Powell, partnership agreements should avoid including provisions that would give the decedent a right to dissolve
the partnership. It may be that future courts would limit Powell’s holding to a review of the terms of the partnership
given the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Helvering v. Helmholz,86 refusing to apply Section 2038
to reach powers granted under state law. If the Powell holding is not so limited it would be extremely difficult to
structure the family limited partnership in a manner to avoid the reach of Section 2036(a)(2). Unfortunately, while
the regulations under Section 2038 limit application of that section if the retained power adds nothing to rights
granted under local law, the Section 2036 regulations do not. Until the courts specifically address application of
Section 2036(a)(2) to the limited partnership default rules imposed by state law, it becomes even more important to
plan in a manner the courts will recognize as being a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration.
In an effort to avoid the reach of Section 2036(a)(2), commentators have explored a number of planning
strategies, at the same time acknowledging those strategies may come up short. 87 One alternative is to include a
provision prohibiting decedent from participating in any decision to dissolve the partnership. Query whether this
type of restriction would be caught by Section 2703, as suggested by the Cahill court? Another alternative suggested
is the partnership be formed by the trustees of irrevocable trusts. Query, whether funding the trust would cause a
gift tax based on the actual value of transferred assets? Query, also, whether, if the transfer to the trust were
structured as an incomplete gift, the power retained to cause the transfer to be treated as an incomplete gift would
require inclusion of the value of the transferred assets under Section 2036(a)(2)? It may be that the best avenue is
for decedent to transfer all partnership interests retained to others at least three years prior to death and insure the
general partner is not decedent’s attorney-in-fact. This should allow for transfer of limited partnership assets at a
discounted value and preclude estate tax inclusion under Sections 2035, 2036 and 2038. Query, however, whether
the analysis of the Cahill court would cause Section 2703 to value the transferred interests at fair market value of
the underlying partnership assets? Alternatively, for those partnerships formed and where limited partnership
interests have been transferred to intended beneficiaries, consider dissolving the partnership and distributing assets
to the limited partners preferably three years prior to decedent’s death. Query, however, would the Cahill court’s
analysis of Section 2703 again cause Section 2703 to apply?
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§1.04 Basis Implications of the Opinions of Judges Halpern and Lauber in Powell
While the courts have developed and revised intricate rules for gross estate inclusion of family limited
partnership assets and interests, they have not similarly addressed the impact of those estate tax rules on income tax
basis under Section 1014. Because application of the Section 1014 basis rules depends in part on whether there is
gross estate inclusion under Section 2036, decisions addressing Section 2036 inclusion of limited partnership assets
provide an important beginning point for understanding income tax basis for property acquired from a decedent.
The dearth of case law directly addressing determination of basis for family limited partnerships leaves some
uncertainty. As planning begins to focus more on obtaining a stepped-up income tax basis at death and as
implementation of the basis consistency rules require a more careful analysis by the executor, answers will likely
be forthcoming.
[1] Section 1014 General Overview
The Code provides specific rules to determine basis of “property in the hands of a person acquiring the
property from a decedent or to whom the property passed from a decedent …”88 Generally property transferred at
death takes a date of death fair market value basis. 89 This value, however, is adjusted if the estate tax return elects
alternate valuation, special use valuation, or the conservation easement exclusion. 90 Excluded from taking a date
of death fair market value basis is any property characterized as income in respect of a decedent. 91 Special rules
apply for DISC stock, 92 and appreciated property that decedent acquired by gift within one year of death. 93
The Code specifically lists the property considered as “acquired from” or having “passed from the
decedent.” The list includes “property acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance, or by the decedent’s estate from
the decedent.”94 It also includes “property acquired from the decedent by reason of death, form of ownership, or
other conditions (including property acquired through the exercise or non-exercise of a power of appointment), if
by reason thereof the property is required to be included in determining the value of the decedent’s gross estate
under [the estate tax code]. …”95 This latter assumes transfer of property by decedent prior to death that is then
pulled back into the gross estate. As a result, depreciation deductions and the like taken prior to decedent’s death
in the hands of the transferee continue to be deemed taken in determining date of death basis. 96 The Second Circuit
in explaining the policy underlying this section stated: “The legislative history surrounding § 1014 indicates that,
in part, Congress enacted that section in an attempt to minimize the tax consequences of decisions made by
executors and trustees concerning when to distribute trust property.”97 These two alternatives for deeming property
to have been “acquired from” or having “passed from the decedent” are key to understanding the impact of Section
1014 on family limited partnership interests. Both are implicated when the gross estate includes assets transferred
to a family limited partnership pursuant to Section 2036, and when limited partnership interests owned by decedent
transfer at death.
[2] Section 1014 Basis with 2036 Inclusion

88

IRC § 1014(a).
IRC § 1014(a)(1).
90
IRC § 1014(a)(2)–(4).
91
IRC § 1014(c), citing IRC § 691.
92
IRC § 1014(d).
93
IRC § 1014(e).
94
IRC § 1014(b)(1).
95
IRC § 1014(b)(9).
96
Id.
97
Connecticut National Bank v United States, 937 F2d 90, 94 (2nd Cir 1991) (citing, e.g., S Rep No 1622, 83rd
Cong, 2nd Sess, 423-24, reprinted in 1954 Code Cong & Admin News 4629, 4740-41).
89

As acknowledged in Judge Lauber’s concurring opinion in Estate of Powell, in the absence of a bona fide
sale for adequate and full consideration, the Tax Court has long included under Section 2036 the underlying value
of the family limited partnership assets in decedent’s gross estate under Section 2036. Inclusion of the value of the
underlying assets makes sense. On the same basis that partnership assets have been included, partnership interests
held by decedent have been disregarded in an effort to avoid double estate taxation. When analyzing the basis
implications of including the full value of the underlying family limited partnership assets as long recognized under
Section 2036 in comparison to application of Section 2043, the long-standing rule yields a result in line with the
date of death fair market value basis contemplated by Section 1014.
[a] Stepped-up Basis for Assets Included Per Section 2036
The Tax Court recently addressed application of Section 1014 when the family limited partnership is
disregarded and assets are included in the gross estate under Section 2036. It did so by way of an order in Hurford
Investments No. 2, Ltd. v. Commissioner98 issued by Judge Holmes subsequent to his initial decision in Estate of
Hurford v. Commissioner.99 In Hurford Investments, the Tax Court addressed the basis of phantom stock earlier
included in decedent’s gross estate when the court disregarded the family limited partnership which owned the
phantom stock. The order states:
But HI-2 has a final tax-minimizing argument. It says it’s entitled to a step up in basis to [$]59,639,588,
which was the phantom stock’s value at the time of Thelma’s death. This might seem an argument too far.
The Code section that creates the step up in basis generally limits that benefit to property acquired “from a
decedent.” I.R.C. §1014(a). Thelma was not yet a “decedent” at the time she contributed the phantom stock
to HI-2. Yet section 1014(b)(9) tells us to consider property “to have been acquired from or to have passed
from the decedent … if by reason thereof the property is required to be included in determining the value
of the decedent’s gross estate.” That’s what happened here — in the estate-tax case we included the value
of the phantom stock in Thelma’s gross estate. See Estate of Hurford, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 442; see also
Connecticut National Bank v. United States, 937 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1991); Schrader v. Commissioner,
420 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1970) (retention of life estate drew value of property into estate but gives
stepped-up basis); H.R. Rept. No. 94-1380, at 36 (1976), 1936-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 770 (“For the purposes of
determining what property is given a stepped-up basis, the test is generally whether the property was
included in the gross estate of the decedent”). 100
The order specifically indicates the underlying partnership assets included per Section 2036 obtain a basis
step up pursuant to Section 1014(b)(9). Treasury regulations make clear neither a filed estate tax return nor estate
tax payment is required to obtain the basis step up under Section 1014(b)(9).101
[b] Likely Stepped-up Basis for Disregarded Partnership Interest
The order in Hurford Investments, however, does not address the basis of partnership interests retained by
decedent as of date of death. For estate tax purposes those interests are ignored. Judge Lauber’s concurring opinion
in Estate of Powell references the limited partnership interests as having “no distinct value” and as “an alter ego”
for the contributed assets. 102 The fact the partnership is ignored for estate tax purposes does not mean it is ignored
for income tax purposes. The characterization of partnership interests as having “no distinct value” for estate tax
purposes does not reflect the reality that the partnership is recognized as a tax reporting entity for income tax
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purposes and that state law recognizes the partnership, and transfer of partnership interests, for property law
purposes.
The limited partnership interests ignored for estate tax inclusion purposes, nevertheless, prove to be
interests acquired from the decedent for state law purposes. If owned by decedent at death, the partnership interests
arguably would obtain a Section 1014 basis as “[p]roperty acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance, or by the
decedent’s estate from the decedent.”103 If the partnership interests were owned by a revocable trust, they arguably
would obtain a Section 1014 basis as “[p]roperty transferred by the decedent during … lifetime in trust …with the
right reserved to the decedent … to revoke the trust…”104 Neither sub-section quoted specifically requires that
property be included in the decedent’s gross estate in order to obtain a date of death fair market value basis. In fact,
the Service took this position in Revenue Ruling 84-139,105 and General Counsel Memorandum 39320,106 with
reference to foreign property not included in the gross estate. In both pronouncements the Service ruled the plain
language of Section 1014(b)(1) does not require inclusion in decedent’s gross estate for its terms to apply.
Specifically, the Service states: “In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the possibility of interpreting
section 1014 to say that only property includable in the decedent’s gross estate can qualify for a basis step-up.
However, both the language of section 1014 and its legislative history negate such an interpretation.” 107 If a court
were to apply the plain wording of Section 1014, the limited partnership interests in the hands of the executor or
beneficiary of decedent’s estate would take a date of death fair market value basis regardless of whether includible
in the decedent’s gross estate. Assuming Section 1014 applies to determine basis of limited partnership interests,
fair market value would likely take into account lack of marketability and minority interest discounts attributable
to those interests.
Only if decedent held the limited partnership interests at death would Section 1014 provide a fair market
value date of death basis for the partnership interests. If decedent had gifted limited partnership interests after
formation, the beneficiaries in receipt would hold the partnership interests with a Section 1015 transferred basis.
The basis of the partnership interests transferred prior to death to beneficiaries would not change on decedent’s
death.
A contrary argument could be made. Treasury regulations indicate: “The purpose of section 1014, is in
general, to provide a basis for property acquired from a decedent that is equal to the value placed upon such property
for purposes of the federal estate tax.”108 In accord with this stated purpose, a court, if it were so inclined, could
interpret the definition of “acquired” or “passing” from decedent to require the property be includible in the gross
estate despite the contrary legislative history mentioned in the General Counsel Memorandum. If that were the
case, the limited partnership interests would not be subject to Section 1014. Such an interpretation would not yield
a zero basis for non-inclusion. Instead, the limited partnership interests would retain the basis as in place prior to
decedent’s death, unaffected by Section 1014. It is curious that Treasury has announced it will not issue private
letter rulings addressing whether assets of a grantor trust not includible in the gross estate can obtain a Section 1014
basis.109 Perhaps this signals an intent by the Service to reverse its earlier position as indicated in Revenue Ruling
84-139 and General Counsel Memorandum 39320.
[3] Income Tax Basis Implications of Judge Lauber’s Concurring Opinion
The same simplified hypothetical used above for the purpose of explaining the differing analyses of Judges
Halpern and Lauber, demonstrates the basis implications of the two opinions. Recall the hypothetical assumes the
family limited partnership has only one asset, a share of stock valued at $100 at the time of formation and at the
103

IRC § 1014(b)(1).
IRC § 1014(b)(2).
105
1984-2 CB 168.
106
1985 GCM LEXIS 3.
107
General Counsel Memorandum 39320.
108
Treas Reg § 1.1014–1(a).
109
Rev Proc 2018-3, 2018–1 IRB 130.
104

same amount as of date of death, with no appreciation or depreciation. It further assumes that, at the time of
formation the share had a basis of $40, and the fair market value of the partnership interests received by decedent
in return for contribution of the share on formation of the family limited partnership takes into account an aggregate
25 percent discount, yielding a partnership interest fair market value of $75. Applying the analysis of Judge Lauber,
the partnership assets would take a Section 1014 basis of $100, the value included in the gross estate pursuant to
Section 2036, and, as a result, the basis per Section 1014(b)(9) and Hurford Investments. For income tax purposes,
the partnership interests would take a fair market value date of death basis of $75, which reflects a 25% discount
and assumes no appreciation from time of receipt to date of death, the basis per Section 1014(b)(1) and Revenue
Ruling 84-139. In this instance, if there is a choice, a Section 754 election should not be made.

[4] Income Tax Basis Implications of Judge Halpern’s Opinion
The opinion of the Tax Court in Powell delivered by Judge Halpern, for the first time, applies Section 2043
to determine the net value included in decedent’s gross estate when Section 2036 applies to include the underlying
partnership assets in the absence of a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration. The court explains inclusion
of partnership interests and assets:
If, after formation of a family limited partnership, a decedent transfers her interest in the partnership inter
vivos by gift, the value of that interest (taking into account any applicable valuation discounts) will be
subject to gift tax. If the decedent instead retains her partnership interest until death, section 2033 will
include the value of that interest (again, subject to applicable discounts) in the value of her gross estate. In
either case, section 2036(a), as limited by section 2043(a), would bring back into the estate the amount of
any discounts (that is, the doughnut hole) allowed in valuing the partnership interest. 110
The court further clarifies in a footnote:
More precisely, the net inclusion required by applying sec 2036(a) to a transfer to a family limited
partnership would equal any discounts applied in valuing the partnership interest the decedent received plus
any appreciation (or less any depreciation) in the value of the transferred assets between the date of the
transfer and the decedent’s date of death. Changes in the value of the transferred assets would affect the
required inclusion because sec. 2036(a) includes in the value of decedent’s gross estate the date-of-death
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value of those assets while sec 2043(a) reduces the required inclusion by the value of the partnership interest
on the date of the transfer.111
Judge Halpern’s analysis has implications for both the partner’s outside basis in the partnership interest and
the inside basis of the partnership assets on a partner’s death.
In determining inside basis, Judge Halpern’s analysis contemplates gross estate inclusion of a portion of
the partnership assets under Section 2036(a)(2), the portion attributable to the “doughnut hole or discount.” The
remaining portion of the partnership assets would not be included in the gross estate. Thus, to determine income
tax basis of partnership assets only the portion includible in the gross estate would take a Section 1014 date of death
basis pursuant to Section 1014(b)(9) and Hurford Investments. The basis of the remaining portion of the assets not
included in the gross estate would remain unchanged at death. 112 The inside basis would be the aggregate of the
bases attributable to the two portions.
In determining outside basis, Judge Halpern’s analysis includes decedent’s partnership interests under
Section 2033 at their date of death fair market value, taking into account applicable discounts. The partnership
interests take a fair market value basis under Section 1014(b)(1) as those interests pass from decedent at death. The
partner’s outside basis, thus, would be adjusted to date of death value of the partnership interests.
Applying the assumptions of the hypothetical to reflect Judge Halpern’s analysis demonstrates the two
opinions lead to different results when determining inside and outside basis. Assume again the partnership has only
one asset, a share of stock valued at $100 at both the time of contribution and at date of death. Assume when
contributed, the share had a basis of $40. Also assume the fair market value of the partnership interest received in
return on formation takes into account a 25 percent discount, yielding a fair market value of $75 for the partnership
interests. Per Judge Halpern’s opinion, the partnership interests take a date of death basis per Section 1014(b)(1)
of $75. The inside basis includes (i) the value of 25 percent of the asset included in decedent’s gross estate or $25,
per Section 1014(b)(9) and Hurford Investments, and (ii) the basis of the remaining 75percent portion of the asset
not included in the decedent’s gross estate reflecting a proportionate basis of $30 (75% of the original $40 basis).
This analysis yields an inside basis for 100 percent of the asset of $55. In this instance, the estate would prefer a
Section 754 election.
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It would not make sense to ignore the proportionate basis attributable to the portion of assets not deemed
included under Judge Halpern’s analysis. This results because of the nature of how outside and inside basis in a
partnership is determined. Typically, in the absence of a Section 754 election the inside basis of partnership
assets remain as before death with respect to that partner. Thus, for the portion not included in the gross estate,
the inside basis should remain the same at decedent’s death.
112

[5] Basis Consistency Rules Raise Issue
Regardless of how the Tax Court resolves the apparent disagreement as to the application of Section 2043,
the opinions of both Judges Lauber and Halpern raise questions under the basis consistency rules for those estates
required to file a federal estate tax return. Basis consistency rules and the accompanying proposed regulations
require assets to be reported on the federal estate tax return to avoid application of the punitive “zero basis rule.”113
Application of Judge Lauber’s opinion indicates partnership interests retained by decedent are not included in the
gross estate. How does the proposed zero basis rule impact basis of disregarded partnership interests? Is the zerobasis rule flawed because it does not recognize that assets may receive a date of death fair market value basis even
if not includible in the gross estate? Application of Judge Halpern’s opinion would require resolution of how to
treat the basis of the portion of partnership assets not included in the gross estate.
§ 1.05 Conclusion
For clients wishing to minimize estate tax, facts surrounding the family limited partnership should support
a substantial non–tax motive that would cause the formation to meet the bona fide sale for adequate and full
consideration exception from application of I.R.C. Section 2036. The Tax Court decisions in Estate of Powell and
Estate of Cahill otherwise make it more difficult to escape gross estate inclusion under Section 2036(a)(2). For
those clients whose focus lies instead on obtaining a Section 1014 basis for the partnership interest (and
consequently partnership assets) at the highest value possible, the Section 754 election combined with careful
structuring of limited partnership interests to provide partners rights resulting in an increase in the value of the
partnership interests will prove important.
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